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Abstract
The perceived dilemma between a choice of focusing on justice 
or peace after armed conflict continues to be an issue around the 
globe. Particularly the treatment of perpetrators remains a highly 
contentious issue, whether amnesty is a policy of impunity or is a 
necessary evil to get to a peace agreement in the first place. Whi-
le the importance of justice is increasingly gaining grounds, cases 
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around the globe show the difficulty to punish the perpetrators. 
Part of the peace versus justice debate is also affecting the fields of 
human rights and conflict resolution that are divided on the topic 
and still fail to communicate effectively between each other. Only 
by understanding their differences, it is possible to collaborate suc-
cessfully together.
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Resumen
El dilema percibido entre la opción de enfocar la justicia o la 
paz después del conflicto armado sigue siendo tema de debate en el 
mundo. En particular el tratamiento que los autores han dado a esta 
temática ha sido muy discutido, el debate se centra en si la amnistía 
es una política de impunidad o es necesario para entrar a un acuer-
do de paz. Mientras la importancia de la justicia cada vez gana más 
terreno, los casos alrededor del mundo muestran el avance que han 
tenido los autores. El debate de la paz y la justicia también afecta el 
campo de los derechos humanos y la resolución de conflicto divi-
diendo el asunto planteado, solo a partir de la comprensión de sus 
diferencias, es posible entender las dos temáticas.
Palabras clave
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Introduction
How can sustainable peace be reached after armed conflict? 
Should the focus be put on stopping the violence and reach peace, or 
is it first of all necessary to bring the perpetrators to justice? The con-
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flict parties need to be convinced to halt violence and bring the armed 
conflict through a negotiated agreement to an end. The belligerents 
need to perceive in their own best interest the necessity to overcome the 
violence; Zartman (2000; 2001) describes this process as a mutually 
hurting stalemate. Although there are many obstacles in the way, some 
willingness needs to be created by third parties to “think about the 
unthinkable” (Rothstein, 1999, p.3) and reach a peace agreement.
For third parties the question arises how they can support the 
conflict parties to reach a peace agreement that will be lasting and is 
sustainable. While it is difficult enough to reach a negotiated agre-
ement, the real problems usually start with the implementation of a 
peace agreement (DeRouen, et al., 2010). According to the findings 
of Fortna (2003; 2004), it is important to reach specific agreements 
to make them last, not least because uncertainty is reduced. Moreo-
ver, the parties need to have the capacity to implement the agree-
ment –despite the fact that the institutional set– up might have been 
weakened considerably during the armed conflict. 
The impact of a peace agreement is important because it in-
fluences the post-conflict society and how it can come to terms with 
atrocities and human rights abuses –committed by all sides– during 
the violent conflict. Major questions arise about how the divisions 
in society can be overcome and how victims can recover from collec-
tive trauma (Volkan, 2001). What do people need in order to move 
on with their lives? During a negotiated agreement, a dilemma is 
emerging: What should be done with the perpetrators? Two basic 
solutions seem to be suggested: (1) perpetrators of human rights 
violations are put on trial in front of a national or international tri-
bunal through the means of criminal justice or (2) amnesties (in 
various degrees) need to be granted to the conflict actors and its 
belligerents to reach a peace agreement in the first place. In short, it 
is a choice between justice or peace.
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The debate of how to deal with perpetrators is one of the most 
ancient dilemmas: the debate between peace versus justice. In other 
words it is phrased as policies of “forgive and forget” about the 
past crimes in contrast to “persecute and punish” the perpetrators 
(Rigby, 2001, pp. 2-6). In the following, this article discusses the 
perceived dilemma of peace versus justice and continues to present 
the influence of this debate on the fields of conflict resolution and 
human rights. Finally, possible ways to overcome the perceived di-
lemma are presented, although it also faces its limitations.
First of all, it is important to define conflict and human rights. 
The assumption is that conflict is natural and normal phenomena, an 
inevitable part of human life. Thus, social or political conflict cannot 
be overcome and will always exist. In fact, conflict is something po-
sitive as long as it is used in a constructive way to bring about social 
change (Lederach, 1995, 1997). However, violent conflict is in its 
nature destructive and the task of peace builders and third parties is 
to transform the violence into non-violent means. Concerning human 
rights, the assumption in this article is that they include civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights that are reflected in international 
and regional instruments. Human rights are universal in their nature, 
thus the article is normatively based on a cosmopolitan ground.
The row about amnesty
In the debate between peace versus justice, the question of am-
nesty is particularly controversial. After the end of the Cold War, 
most violent conflicts ended with a negotiated agreement (Kreutz, 
2010)1; in fact, the 1990s were declared as the decade of peace agre-
ements (Bell, 2006). One of the major concerns is the creation of the 
1  One of the few exceptions where there is an outright military victory is the case of Sri Lanka 
where the government had an outright victory in 2009 over the insurgence group popularly known 
as Tamil Tigers (their official name was Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - LTTE), therefore ending 
a civil war that was going on for more than 25 years as it is well described in Hashim (2013).
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right conditions –Zartman (2000; 2001) talks about the “ripeness” 
of a conflict– so that the parties involved in the bargaining process 
would be willing and ready to sign and commit themselves to a do-
cument that puts the violence to an end. Such negotiation processes 
often include those people who have a lot of blood on their hands. 
May it be a repressive president, rebel leaders or military comman-
ders - they are key figures that need to be included in a lasting peace 
agreement. The question arises whether those individuals involved 
in major human rights violations simply get away with the nume-
rous human rights violations they have committed in the past.
For a long time, particularly during the Cold War, compromises 
had to be made with the perpetrators to bring a conflict to an end. 
The main and immediate concern is to stop the suffering, and may 
that include also amnesties for war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity. It is the important and difficult question whether amnesties 
for serious crimes are worthwhile of a strategy or not. Are amnesty 
deals simple protection mechanisms for tyrants to enjoy a peaceful 
retirement or may it even allow them to continue influencing a post-
conflict order?
After the end of the Cold War, the perspective on amnesty has 
changed and instead of immunity, there was a strong move towards 
criminal prosecution to those individuals that have been mostly res-
ponsible for ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
or even genocide. The assumption is that when the justice system 
–a court or a tribunal– does not address mass crimes, perpetrators 
are not punished and do not face any consequences for their viola-
tions of human rights and consequently the danger of reoccurrence 
of violence is very high due to the impunity. As Snyder and Vin-
jamuri (2002) point out, human rights advocacy groups like Hu-
man Rights Watch and Amnesty International have made a critical 
contribution to push for the advance of international human rights 
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by publicizing the need to prevent mass atrocities and widespread 
political killings and torture. Moreover, there has been an increasing 
appetite for humanitarian interventions after the Cold War period 
(Kydd & Straus, 2013), particularly with the rise of the Responsibi-
lity to Protect (R2P) in 2005, an emerging concept to prevent and 
stop mass atrocities (Evans, 2008; Strauss, 2009).
With the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), there has been a tremendous shift in the international com-
munity towards justice because now even sitting presidents can 
be indicted. Human rights advocates point out that impunity for 
perpetrators will undermine a new democratic order and a peace 
settlement. Today, criminal trials of major perpetrators have beco-
me commonplace since the 1990s with the development of hybrid 
tribunals like in Cambodia or Sierra Leone, international tribunals 
like in Rwanda and Ex-Yugoslavia and particularly the establishment 
of the ICC in 2002. Indeed, demands for individual accountability 
for human-rights violations have almost exploded to what Sikkink 
(2011) calls a global “justice cascade”.
Such kind of advocacy strategy for human rights often has one 
goal: the prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities according to uni-
versal standards. This proposition is based on the idea that there are 
international obligations to be fulfilled, not least human rights stan-
dards that bring about justice. This proposition of justice is taken as a 
matter of principle. The outcome is important –justice– while there is 
not that much focus on the process of how the peace is reached. Yet, 
this approach risks more atrocities than it would prevent, because it 
pays insufficient attention to political realities. The threat of prosecu-
tion can lead to the exclusion or walking-out of the conflict parties 
present at the negotiation table, although these actors might be cru-
cial for signing a peace deal. The reality in the aftermath of violent 
conflicts, the dilemma between peace and justice can be much more 
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difficult than a debate on moral grounds. In many cases, from Nor-
thern Ireland to Mozambique, wide-ranging amnesties were granted 
because an end to violence seemed impossible to achieve on any other 
terms. Was that the price to pay for peace?
Ten cases studies about the impact of justice
During the Cold War, amnesties and impunity dominated. In 
the mid-1970s, three southern European dictatorships fell (Greece, 
Spain and Portugal), while six South American dictatorships co-
llapsed from 1979 to 1989 (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Pa-
raguay and Uruguay). All of these countries transitioned back to 
democracy and have in common that they have allowed impunity 
for the perpetrators who committed torture as well as atrocities and 
were responsible for “disappearances” during the dictatorship2. Only 
much later, the justice debate flared up again in Latin America, par-
ticularly with the arrest of general Augusto Pinochet in London in 
1998. The experience of these countries would show that only with 
a stable democracy it is possible (but not necessarily implemented) 
to punish and prosecute the perpetrators of human rights violations. 
With the rise of the ICC, it is not so easy anymore –if not impos-
sible– to allow for blanket amnesties because justice seems to be 
trumping peace.
In the following, overall ten case studies (seven African cases 
and three European cases) of the past 20 years are briefly discus-
sed to review the impact of the use of justice mechanisms and the 
problems that come along with it. First of all, let us take the case of 
2  However, in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile so-called truth commissions were established in the 
1980s. These non-judicial tools should highlight the crimes perpetrated during the dictatorship, 
although the perpetrators would not face direct judicial consequences. The only exception was 
Argentina that in fact jailed the most notorious perpetrators – but not for long, as president 
Carlos Menem released those convicted with amnesty laws in 1989/90. In Brazil (2011) and 
Paraguay (2004), truth commissions were established much later. While the truth commis-
sions had not a direct impact, it contributed to a wider understandings of the crimes committed 
by the dictatorial regimes and contributed to prosecutions during the past years.
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Libya where the ICC issued a warrant against Muammar Gaddafi in 
May 2011, due to alleged human rights violations connected to the 
Arab Spring uprising in Libya.3 This move of ICC prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo limited the available options of Gaddafi, thus ma-
king a peace deal with the opposition groups more difficult and 
eventually leading to the NATO intervention.4 Until today, Libya is 
on the edge of falling apart; no stability has been reached since the 
fall of Gaddafi’s regime in October 2011 as two rival governments 
are struggling for power and Islamic State (IS) is active as well (Ku-
perman, 2015).
Also in other countries where the ICC got involved, like in 
Sudan, the court has closed off or at least limited the space for 
peace negotiations, thus risking prolonged violence and continued 
human-rights abuses. The ICC issued a warrant against Sudanese 
president Omar al-Bashir in March 2009 for alleged war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in the western region of Darfur where a 
violent conflict has caused since 2003 the lives of more than 200 
000 people (Buzzard, 2009; de Waal, 2007). The first warrant of 
the ICC against a sitting president was a factor that hampered the 
peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and the va-
rious rebel groups of Darfur; in particular because the ICC did not 
conduct investigations against any of the rebel leaders. Moreover, 
it has contributed to the failure of the ongoing disarmament and 
demobilization program (Rodman, 2014). In fact, there is even the 
risk that no one of the Sudanese regime is actually brought to prose-
cution or trial and Bashir continues to be in power in Sudan.
There is a pattern of the ICC intervening at earlier stages in 
the escalation of conflict with the hope that its scrutiny will halt 
3 Liolos (2012) presents a discussion of the warrant against Gaddafi and argues that the ICC 
should actively be involved in trying accused regime members. 
4 Moreno-Ocampo’s decision for an ICC warrant was based on United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011.
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further human-rights abuses (Simmons & Danner, 2010). And yet, 
it is clear that mass human rights violations continue in many areas 
where the ICC is active. The important step for the ICC is that its 
prosecutor has established important precedents for the notion that 
accountability need not wait for stability. In fact, the ICC has put 
forward a discourse suggesting that justice causes peace.
However, these processes of the ICC can be inherently flawed 
demonstrated by the examples of Uganda and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC) (Nouwen & Werner, 2011). Both govern-
ments invited the ICC to investigate and prosecute crimes in their 
own territories. The international community applauded the ruling 
elites of the two countries because it was welcomed as a public com-
mitment to human rights and international justice. However, the 
intentions of the Uganda’s and DRC’s governments show a very 
different story as they successfully tried to delegitimize and remove 
their political rivals or troublesome insurgents that could not be 
defeated militarily (Branch, 2005; Clark, 2008). There is no doubt, 
that these individuals from Uganda and the DRC who are prosecut-
ed at the ICC committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
And yet, the governments secured their own impunity by threaten-
ing non-co-operation with the ICC if their own violations of human 
rights would be investigated.
A similar case took place in Côte d’Ivoire, where the ICC invol-
vement has so far served to reinforce the international credibility of 
President Alassane Ouattara while his rival, former president Lau-
rent Gbagbo, is in The Hague – which is perceived as victor’s justice 
(Lee & Marriot, 2013). The examples show that the ICC is also a 
very political institution although the credibility and legitimacy of 
the court depend on the perception that is an independent and im-
partial organization. The one-sided decisions in the case of Uganda, 
the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire contribute to a justice imbalance and the 
perception of a politicized justice (Tiemessen, 2014).
Johannes Langer
174
CRITERIOS - Cuadernos de Ciencias Jurídicas y Política Internacional
Vol. 8. N.° 1 p. 165-189. enero-junio de 2015
However, it is not only the ICC but also other justice mecha-
nisms that can be problematic. In particular, transitional justice me-
chanisms have become very popular tools during transition periods 
from dictatorship to democracy or from civil war to peaceful coe-
xistence (Hayner, 2011; Roht-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006). It 
aims to link complex ethical, legal and political choices after a ne-
gotiated agreement that should end the violence, restore peace, and 
prevent the reoccurrence of armed conflict. Yet, transitional justice 
mechanisms can lead to evasion instead of accountability of human 
rights abuses. Not all governments that establish post-conflict jus-
tice mechanisms have made a break with the past. Instead, senior 
officials may have been implicated in past abuses and are running 
these very institutions. Particularly with power-sharing arrange-
ments, post-conflict governments may perceive the need to compri-
se on individuals that are responsible for crimes against humanity 
committed during times of conflict. As a result, political elites may 
share an interest in continued impunity, demonstrated by the two 
examples of Kenya and Sierra Leone.
An example of this challenge is the Kenyan coalition gover-
nment that did set up a transitional justice mechanism after the 
2007/8 post-election violence: the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC). Its promise was to record past abuses sin-
ce Kenya’s independence in 1963, while promoting accountability 
and national healing and in May 2013 a final report was published 
(Naughton, 2014). The Kenyan government, however, demonstra-
ted little commitment to the TJRC and installed at the beginning a 
chairman who was responsible for human rights abuses. That goes 
along with the failure to cooperate with the ICC where at the time 
six Kenyans had their case pending. Rather, it tired to undermine 
the ICC process, including attempts to get the UNSC to defer the 
ICC’s involvement and to convince African countries to withdraw 
from the ICC (Höhn, 2014).
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In Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor faced an 11-count indictment 
in April 2012 with charges covering a wide variety of atrocities in a 
unanimous judgment by the Special Court of Sierra Leone. Taylor 
was the first former head of state to be convicted by an international 
criminal tribunal since the Nuremberg trials after the Second World 
War. He was convicted for crimes committed in Sierra Leone from 
1996-2002, despite not having set foot in the country during that 
time as the president of Liberia. However, he was not convicted for 
the original time suggested and the situation in Sierra Leone has 
hardly improved overall while millions of dollars were spent on the 
hybrid court (Jalloh, 2011). Moreover, prosecutions have made it 
more difficult to persuade combatants and ex-combatants into di-
sarming and demobilizing because they fear legal action as well. 
And as Mieth (2013) shows in her article, many Sierra Leoneans 
do not feel that justice was brought to them with the special court.
While only African cases have been discussed so far, also in other 
parts of the world the limitations of the efforts of justice can be seen. 
In Bosnia and Kosovo, former parts of Yugoslavia, the peacekeeping 
missions after the violent conflicts favored amnesties and immuni-
ty arrangements – in contrast to the prosecutors of international cri-
mes (Visoka, 2012). While the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) demanded the delivery of prominent 
ICTY indictees like Radovan Karadzic or Ratko Mladic, the NATO 
forces on the ground did little to capture them (Méndez, 2012, pp. 
95-96). Also in Kosovo, the UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) did not collaborate with the tribunal about a war 
criminal because the person was considered as one of the few people 
they could actually work with in establishing a new country. 
Also in Northern Ireland, the last case study that is discussed, 
might still be at war unless significant numbers of people on both 
sides had been prepared to do compromises and see people they re-
garded as criminals being released from prison as part of a wide-ran-
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ging amnesty. Northern Ireland’s fragile peace is based on a profound 
disagreement over how to regard violent actions in the recent past 
before the of 1998: were they terrorist outrages or were they legiti-
mate actions in the context of a “liberation” war? It was the conscious 
decision though to not bring the perpetrators to the courts, because 
otherwise an agreement could have not been reached (Bell, 2002).
The ten case studies have shown that a variety of problems are 
caused with the focus on justice during or after violent conflict, 
because it is limiting the possibility of negotiations (Libya, Sudan), 
is an excuse to go after one’s political opponent (DRC, Uganda), is 
an instrument to “satisfy” the international community but one is 
not taking it seriously (Kenya) or is seen as a burden that severely 
undermines for the implementation of a peace agreement (Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Northern Ireland).
The troubles to sign an agreement
As Snyder and Vinjamuri point out, “[j]ustice does not lead; it 
follows” (2002, p.6). After the violent conflict, it is a political bar-
gain among the contending groups to create robust administrative 
institutions that can predictably enforce the law. Preventing further 
atrocities and enhancing respect for the law will frequently depend 
on the negotiation agreement that creates effective political coali-
tions to contain the power of spoilers – those people with influen-
ce that try to undermine the process (Stedman, 1997). Amnesty, 
which has the connotation to simply ignore the past abuses of per-
petrators, is sometimes perceived as a necessary tool in peace nego-
tiations. Only when a negotiated deal is achieved and institutions 
are in place again, the principle of the rule of law becomes more 
feasible. Universal standards of criminal justice in the absence of 
political and institutional preconditions may in fact risk weakening 
the norms of justice by revealing their ineffectiveness and hindering 
necessary political bargaining.
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Mediators negotiating peace agreements have tended to view 
the prospect of prosecution of the perpetrators as an unfortunate 
obstacle to their work as it is implicit in the classical article of Touval 
and Zartman on mediation (1986). Some fear that the mere specter 
of trial will undermine and eventually bring to an end the fragile 
peace talks. Mediators often feel pressed to push justice aside. Today, 
proponents of amnesty argue that those bearing the greatest res-
ponsibility for atrocities have no interest in laying down their arms 
unless they can avoid criminal charges. Other mediators argue that 
justice should wait until those culpable are no longer in positions 
of authority, since seeking prosecution bears the risk of retaliation, 
including humanitarian agencies. In the short term, it is easy to un-
derstand the temptation to forego justice in an effort to end armed 
conflict. Or, as Vanjamuri concludes, “contrary to the mantra that 
justice delayed is justice denied, the most promising way to promote 
justice may be to postpone it” (2010, p.208).
Foregoing accountability often fails to result in the expected 
benefits. Instead of putting a conflict to rest, an explicit amnesty 
that grants immunity for war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide may be an implicit approval of wrongdoings that will 
as a consequence not allow to achieve the desired peace. All too 
often a peace that is conditioned on impunity for these crimes is 
not sustainable. Even worse, it sets a precedent of impunity for po-
tential perpetrators to commit atrocities and human rights abuses 
without getting punished. While under the pressure of trying to 
negotiate a peace deal, justice may seem like a dispensable luxury. 
In the long run, however, the lack of accountability can create the 
fertile ground of new violations, because the truth about the past 
is still not known and it is easy to manipulate history in the pursuit 
of their political ends and infuriate the people to the point that 
new conflict comes about.
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Proponents of a stronger international criminal law regime and 
activists of human rights have tried to insulate justice from poli-
tics (Rodman, 2006; 2014). They justify this approach with several 
claims. Some argue that the pursuit of justice through uncompro-
mising legal accountability is a matter of absolute principle, regard-
less of consequences. Others have chosen to go about their past very 
differently and have not actively dealt with their past. A famous 
example is Spain where the crimes committed during the civil war 
of the 1930s and the following dictatorship is a period of oblivion. 
Was forgetting a necessary price to pay for the social peace when 
democracy was reinstalled after general Franco’s death?
Human rights versus conflict resolution
In the second part of the article follows a discussion about the 
differences of the worldview between academics and practitioners of 
human rights on the one side, and conflict resolution on the other. 
Although these two camps appear to be almost the same from the 
outside, they are in fact a representation of the justice versus pea-
ce debate. While they do work in a very similar environment, it is 
not the same people working there. There are a lot of differences 
in practice that can lead to contradictions in action that can even 
be mutually exclusive. In fact, human rights activists and conflict 
resolution practitioners speak very different languages and there is 
insufficient interaction going on.
To be sure, there are similarities between the two camps. As 
Lutz, Babbitt and Hannum (2003, p.173) point out, human rights 
and conflict resolution have numerous similar goals: 1) both seek to 
end violence, 2) limit the loss of human lives, 3) try to stop suffe-
ring, 4) make sure that violence does not reoccur, 5) respect of the 
rights of everyone, 6) impartiality to all parties, and 7) prevention 
is the best way. And yet, there are many differences between human 
rights activists and conflict resolution practitioners.
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Human rights folks often have a background in legal studies; it 
is thus logical that they focus on legal issues. They want to hold per-
petrators accountable, reestablish the rule of law and do not mind to 
blame and shame the perpetrators. In contrast, practitioners of con-
flict resolution have often a diverse background – like psychology, 
anthropology, sociology or international relations. They are usually 
focused to achieve peace with various strategies that the conflict 
resolution toolbox offers to them. One of the key principles is com-
munication and therefore one cannot be scared to shake hands with 
those who have blood on their hands, as long as there is a perception 
that they can bring the armed conflict to an end. It is therefore a 
very pragmatic approach that requires flexibility and cooperation.
For sure, both groups are needed to actually stop massacres 
and massive human rights violations. As Baker puts it, “[they] sha-
re a common concern to end conflict, but favor different strategies 
in achieving it” (1996, p.565). And yet, there are some crucial di-
fferences: 1) a negotiated settlement often does not give sufficient 
emphasis on human rights, 2) human rights advocates do not consi-
der the pressures of mediators, 3) without amnesty, there is no peace 
deal, 4) judicial sentences for criminals and perpetrators is necessary, 
otherwise there is no sense for justice, and 5) while both want to see 
sustainable peace with justice, it is unclear what should come first: 
peace or justice. Having these differences in mind, it is important as 
well to understand the origins of human rights and conflict resolu-
tion that will be presented in the following two sub-chapters. 
The rise of human rights and the legal perspective
With the end of the horrors of the Second World War, a mo-
mentum was reached to codify human rights that culminated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. While 
the ratification of human rights on paper was a great achievement 
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in itself, it was a very different story about its implementation. The 
challenge remains until today to implement all the norms promised 
to people around the globe, although in the meantime strong regio-
nal mechanisms of human rights have been established, particularly 
in Europe and the Americas (Steiner & Alston, 2000, p.779). Par-
ticularly with the end of the Cold War, human rights advocates are 
very active to investigate human rights abuses and be vocal about 
them. NGOs like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International 
stand up for the victims that often have been voiceless beforehand 
and try to lobby other governments or regional and international 
organizations to get active. In the short run, human rights NGOs 
pressure governments to end human rights violations while in the 
long run, they want to secure human rights protection across the 
globe. This is done through shaming, thus through activist means 
which often compromises cultural sensitivity.
Over time, also humanitarian law became more important be-
cause human rights defenders recognized that it would be necessary 
in conflict to rely on law that predates human rights law. The most 
important defense mechanisms can be found in the four Geneva 
Conventions that established international legal norms, not least 
about the treatment of soldiers, the wounded and civilians during 
warfare. The Rome Statute of 1998 that is the basis of the ICC, es-
tablished four punishable crimes, namely crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, genocide, and crime of aggression.
In contrast to international human rights groups that try to 
lobby for action and awareness about major abuses of human rights 
around the globe, local human rights NGO are the conscience of 
their society because they try to protect citizens at risk and demand 
from their government to change policies, reform the security appa-
ratus or make sure that any type of minorities are protected. Af-
ter conflict, human rights activists want to discover the “truth,” 
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to document all the violations with the intent that they cannot re-
occur in the future. This should come along with punishment of 
perpetrators. Therefore, human rights actors want to apply objec-
tive standards to determine issues of justice and punish those that 
violated the standards. They are focused on principles, on the legal 
protection of rights. This is very much related to their role they have 
during this process, like a lawyer, an advocate or a monitor. Per se, 
this role requires an adversarial position towards the perpetrator; 
these people need to speak out against injustice and human rights 
violations. Many times, human rights experts serve as leading figu-
res in peace-building processes because they are seen as capable and 
trustworthy.
For human rights activists, perpetrators rather should be exclu-
ded from peace talks. Human rights abuses should be highlighted 
during negotiations because it should influence the negotiation pro-
cess and ultimately the settlement as well. Any compromise is of-
ten deemed as illegitimate or non-negotiable because victims would 
continuously be under threat and their suffering would not be ad-
dressed adequately. In the following, a presentation of conflict reso-
lution practitioners and their work shows a very different approach 
to violence and human rights abuses.
The focus of conflict resolution on settlement
In contrast to human rights activists, conflict resolvers fra-
me their practice very differently. The focus is about bringing all 
conflict actors together that will allow space for conversations. The 
power of words and communication is taken as a given. The spa-
ce that is given to the conflict parties is an important requisite to 
air their grievances, including by those individuals that are widely 
perceived to be responsible for major human rights abuses. Usually, 
also perpetrators have experienced personal loss - in fact, the conse-
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quent suffering might have impacted their behavior. Providing the 
possibility to voice their sorrow can help to humanize the other and 
establish vital relationships across the lines of the conflict actors. It 
can be the first, although small, step towards reconciliation in the 
long run.
Conflict resolvers will also talk to those groups or individuals 
that might disrupt the process, potential spoilers. This is done 
purposefully, because otherwise the likelihood of failure is bigger. 
Therefore, conflict resolution practitioners want to reconcile needs, 
interests and concerns of the conflict actors. It is not necessary to de-
cide who is right and who is wrong. There is no normative thinking 
that would lead to the need of judging the conflict parties, with the 
implicit assumption that it will allow for more flexibility during a 
negotiation.
There is a focus on reconciliation between the actors, whereby 
this should be achieved thanks to the facilitation of the talks that 
are participatory and develop trust between the conflict parties. All 
of that is related to the role of conflict resolution actors, usually 
being a facilitator, mediator or reconciler between the conflict par-
ties. After the Cold War, also culture has become a major issue as 
well in conflict resolution over the past 25 years or so. Not only are 
culture-sensitive approaches important, usually conflict resolution 
practitioners try to use indigenous methods in the first place (Augs-
burger, 1992)5.
5 As Augsburger points out, third parties are often blatantly ignorant about the context they are 
going to, including very experienced mediators and theorists. He points to three central con-
trasts that exist between the Westernized culture and traditional culture (1) situational versus 
cultural, (2) individual versus communal, and (3) direct versus indirect (Augsburger, 1992, 
pp. 6-10). The differences are crucial in mediation as Westernized mediators have an “etic” 
approach that is describe by expertise, prescription and imports methodology while traditional 
mediators are using “emic” approaches that are characterized by unawareness, inductive work 
and the discovery of a methodology that is reinforced and used (Augsburger, 1992, pp. 35-37).
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Over the past 30 years, conflict resolutions NGOs have filled 
out the role to also bring in non-state actors into conflict resolution. 
Others are involved in peace education or in training critical stake-
holders in conflict resolution skills. Conflict resolvers try to reach 
a settlement and decrease the level of violence. Thanks to the im-
proved relationships, conflict resolvers aim to resolve or prevent an 
outbreak of violence. However, their aim is to direct the energy of 
conflict from violent means towards constructive ends. In contrast 
to human rights advocates, conflict resolvers do not want to blame 
the conflict parties because they believe in a constructive problem-
solving approach.
Conclusion: Overcoming the divide
There is a growing understanding that peace and justice can be 
mutually reinforcing instead of being exclusive. Enduring and long-
term peace is much more than the immediate goal of ending a con-
flict and relies on justice and accountability to ensure sustainability. 
Also, justice does not need to be perceived as retributive justice but 
rather develop restorative justice systems that allow going beyond 
the typical prosecution mechanisms. Peace and justice seldom walk 
alone but are intrinsically linked. In the words of Sriram and Pillay, 
“[i]n reality the choice is seldom ‘justice’ or ‘peace’ but rather a com-
plex mixture of both” (2010, p.1). None of the actors involved are 
actually neutral about human rights and justice. Everyone will agree 
that any durable peace needs to address the underlying causes and 
roots of violent conflict. Therefore, the international community 
and the transitional government need to overcome greed –economic 
motives and poverty that involves common people into civil war 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003)– as well 
as grievance, which explains armed conflict through identity and 
relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Olson, 1965). The importance to 
build institutions after conflict decides about the success towards 
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peace and the reform of the justice sector is a key part of it (Paris, 
2004, pp. 205-207).
Different points can be identified where human rights and con-
flict resolution can meet, including: 1) human rights abuses usually 
are conducted in the context of grievance and structural violence 
and are often the cause of violent conflict, 2) the institutions of a 
country need to respect human rights as a given in their policies to 
prevent conflict, 3) the prescriptive approach of human rights actors 
must be combined with the facilitative approach of conflict resolu-
tion practitioners, 4) conflict resolution can serve as an alternative to 
litigation in dealing with human rights violations, 5) peace-building 
processes are long-term and the prevention of human rights vio-
lations are an absolute integral part to satisfy basic human needs, 
and 6) human rights can reinforce the need to involve civil socie-
ty (Bell, 2006; Parlevliet, 2002). To achieve all of that, both sides 
need further training from the other side. Conflict resolvers need 
to have more awareness about human rights concerns. At the same 
time, human rights defenders need to be more aware of the conflict 
resolution toolbox, including negotiation, mediation, and problem-
solving workshops.
Thus, in fact, a lot of synergy exists between the two fields. As 
long as peace is not only defined as negative peace (the absence of 
war), but as positive peace (social justice), the divide between peace 
versus justice seems much smaller and conflict resolution practitio-
ners and human rights activists are not that far away. The differen-
ce, however, which strategy to take reaching sustainable peace will 
persist. 
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